Introduction
The UK has tended not to feature prominently in many analyses of European integration. One reason may be that, as one of Europe's leading examples of a 'liberal market economy', or LME (Hall and Soskice 2001) , the country is already assumed to fit closely with the liberal order said to characterise the economic governance of the European Union (Scharpf 2010) .
Another reason stems from its semi-detached (soon to be fully-detached) status in the EU, exemplified by its decision to stand apart from several of the EU's most important projects, such as the Single Currency. Yet this perspective is slightly misleading. Aside from the UK's enthusiastic promotion of the Single European Market, there are two other important policy areas of European integration in which the UK has participated fully: labour mobility and skills policies.
Central to both has been its adoption of the competitiveness and high-technology policies of the Lisbon and 2020 Agendas. The UK does very well on the scorecard for adherence to 2020 targets, which arguably complement existing UK technology policy. The other was the UK's embrace of labour mobility -now, ironically, a major cause of the voter disquiet which led to Brexit. The UK was one of the very few EU states (the others being Ireland and Sweden) to fully open its borders to low-skilled immigration from the A8 accession countries in 2004, a decision which resulted in significant levels of low-wage immigration from eastern Europe (Wadsworth et al 2016) .
These policies have had important economic and distributional consequences. The key argument is that the twin strands of European integration that were embraced by the UK and which fed into domestic policies -namely, a high-tech industrial strategy and labour mobility Moreover, there are reasons to suspect that low wage immigration may be an important structural feature of an economy such as the UK's, where economic growth and aggregate demand is fueled by domestic consumption rather than exports (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016) . Thus, the article contributes to the focus of this special issue in two ways: it provides an example of continued institutional divergence; but it also highlights how European integration may exacerbate internal divisions and increase domestic political tensions.
The bifurcated structure of UK capitalism
Divisions between its high and low-skilled labour markets are a deep-rooted and longstanding feature of the UK's LME model (cf: Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Crouch et al 1999; Finegold and Soskice 1988) . At the top end of the labour market, the UK is noted for producing large numbers of university graduates with general, transferable skills who go on to thrive in its large, and relatively well-paid, professional services sector. This success is, unfortunately, not matched at the lower end, where significant cohorts of school leavers equipped with inadequate educational and technical qualifications sustain a number of low productivity manufacturing, processing and services industries (Besley et al 2013) .
Immigration plays an important part in both labour market sectors, although it has, arguably, been more critical for the low-cost segment in the past decade (Ruhs 2006) . The success of the UK's innovative high-tech sector, as well as its powerful financial services industry, hinges on being able to recruit suitably qualified technology workers to meet firms' personnel demands in the face of rapidly changing business opportunities. Unsurprisingly, both the UK's technology and financial services sectors were enthusiastic lobbyists for free movement of labour. Central to this has been the UK's ability to tap into large pools of international students studying STEM subjects at its highly-ranked universities, who go on to jobs in the finance and technology sector, alongside domestic graduates. The thrust of industrial policy, moreover, has tended to prioritise the UK's science and technology base, while overlooking lower-value sectors.
At the lower end of the scale, on the other hand, immigration from low wage countries appears to have served a very different purpose: to keep the lid on wages and make up for skills shortages. This provided an equally powerful incentive for politicians to camouflage failures over training policies by supporting low-wage immigration, in alliance with employers in labour-intensive sectors (Wright 2012). As was acknowledged by policymakers (House of Lords 2008: 29) , the ready availability of cheap, energetic workers from A8 countries removed incentives for these industries to invest in training. This was despite the exhortation of successive governments, which have made 'rebalancing' and 'upgrading' the UK labour market a central plank of economic policy.
This article suggests, therefore, that the EU's Agenda 2020 and free movement policies reinforce, in tandem, British labour market strategies and divisions. In a nutshell, the combination of the UK's LME institutions, particularly its flexible labour market and its voluntarist, uncoordinated training regime, with the EU's skills and immigration policies which foster a high-technology sector on the one hand, while reinforcing the competitive strategies of low-wage, low-productivity industries on the other, results in an economy with a notably bifurcated structure that reinforces social and geographical divisions. But is there really a relationship between the EU (and free movement) and low wages?
All the evidence shows either non-existent, or very small, downward pressures on wages from immigration, even at the very local level and in micro-economies already defined by low skill employment (Clarke 2016; Nickell and Saleheen 2015; Portes 2016) . A significant influx of low-skilled immigration probably did have a negative effect on the economy and labour market, but its effect operated not on local wage rates but on the incentives of employers, who were presented with a solution to their training problems in the form of cheap workers.
Meanwhile, successive UK governments from the 1990s onwards pursued a science-based industrial policy centred on promoting the high-skill 'Knowledge Economy', while also encouraging low wage immigration as the answer to stubborn deficiencies in skills.
This article therefore highlights contradictions in skills and industrial policies aimed at fostering more sustainable and socially inclusive sources of growth, and suggests that these have been exacerbated by EU policies, which the UK adopted and applied. But it also poses deeper questions over the future resilience of the UK's growth model, which is reliant on low costs in many industries to drive consumption-led growth. This has exacerbated economic and social tensions to the extent that the UK is now set on a path to leave the EU entirely.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section two situates the UK experience within debates about the development of European models of capitalism. Section three shows how the EU 2020 agenda and free movement impacted the UK labour market, highlighting how these exacerbated existing divisions over skills. Section four demonstrates that failure to tackle these divisions was not due to a failure of partisan politics; rather, these failures are institutional in nature and stem from the UK's voluntarist and un-coordinated nature of firm training, which is analysed in section five. Section six concludes.
The politics of the UK's liberal model of capitalism
Comparative political economy (CPE) debates about divergence or convergence among European models of capitalism have been fueled by a number of changes in political economies over the last 15 years. Nevertheless, as argued in the introduction to this special issue, there are few signs that European integration is leading to convergence around one particular economic or social model. On the other hand, the key drivers of divergenceeconomic, technological and political -are undoubtedly being rethought by CPE scholars.
The original VoC literature was mainly concerned with the preferences of firms in export-led sectors and the micro-economic institutions supporting their competitive strategies.
Accordingly, VoC focused on manufacturing, tended to ignore the role of the State in shaping markets and highlighted the presence or absence of collective bargaining institutions in labour 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 These assumptions have been challenged by socio-economic structural changes since then: notably the decline of manufacturing and the rise of services; falls in unionization and collective bargaining rates in CME labour markets; and new forms of capitalist organization, such as the 'sharing' and 'knowledge' economies (Hall 2015) . Nevertheless, a number of VoC scholars have responded to these changes by adapting and improving, rather than abandoning, its core precepts. For example, Thelen (2014) acknowledges that radical reform programs in
Nordic countries in the last decade have seen them diverge from CMEs like Germany.
However, she argues that they retain their core institutions for coordination as well as a commitment to labour market decommodification, which sets them well apart from LMEs.
Moreover, while most advanced European economies have responded to the challenge presented by the shift to the 'Knowledge Economy' by revamping their institutions for training and technology transfer, there remain considerable differences in the scope and impact of these across countries (Hall 2015; Coulter and Garcia-Calvo 2017) . Overall, considerable evidence remains to support a view of continued diversity in European capitalism along lines suggested by VoC (Schneider and Paunescu 2012).
As for the UK, few commentators doubt that it remains firmly in the LME camp due to its reliance on markets in wage bargaining, skill formation and firm governance, as originally specified by Hall and Soskice. Indeed, it is striking how the left-leaning 'New' Labour government of Tony Blair, despite its landslide majority in 1997 followed by two further victories, chose to work firmly with, rather than against, the grain of its LME institutions 
A dualized labour market
A particular failing of the UK's system of capitalism is its inability to tackle long-standing inadequacies in technical training. As a result, it continues to produce large numbers of graduates with general, transferable skills alongside a long tail of school leavers with inadequate qualifications and poor employment prospects. This is in line with VoC's contention that the economies of LMEs like the UK face a dualized structure. Although some high-technology and radically-innovative firms at or near the top of global value chains may flourish in LMEs, the product strategies of many others will hinge on production of less sophisticated, price-sensitive goods and services, requiring low-cost inputs. A dualized labour force, comprising elite university graduates and skilled technicians at the top, and an abundance of cheaply-trained workers at the bottom, arguably suits these ambitions and the UK's model of economic competitiveness has not tended to be associated with a wide distribution of skills (Green and Sakomoto 2001) .
Growing skills cleavages therefore pinpoint negative features of the UK's LME growth model that are at odds with the aspirations of policymakers to improve the general level of skills; namely, its inability to generate large numbers of high-skilled, high productivity jobs outside a small network of leading firms in service and manufacturing sectors. The training problem shows up in the UK's poor record on productivity and a hollowing out of the labour force between high and low skilled jobs (Plunkett and Pesoa 2013) . Firms at the top-end are able to form networks or make use of the high level of general skills. At the low-end, low Moreover, the UK arguably faces limited pressure to change as it has been able to sustain relatively high growth rates through economic policies that fuel consumption whilst encouraging households to take on private debt. Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) are correct to point out that this is not a sustainable strategy in the long-run as it produces current account deficits that ultimately have to be dealt with through painful devaluations. Nevertheless, it has let policymakers off the hook in regards to addressing the deep-seated structural problems within the UK economy, notably its skills system and low wage economy.
An additional problem may lie with political and electoral alignments in the UK. These fail to produce overwhelming pressure for skills reform and other competitiveness issues, and in turn, widens the divide between skilled and unskilled workers. An emerging strand of recent CPE scholarship examines how economic policies ultimately devised by elites influence, and are influenced by, shifting electoral coalitions. Iversen and Soskice (2015) argue that in countries such as the UK, with majoritarian electoral systems favouring right of centre governments, unskilled workers will tend to be ignored by policymakers who tend to target middle class swing voters by investing in higher education.
On the other hand, Beramendi et al (2014) suggest that the UK has undergone a transition to a 'competitiveness-oriented capitalism' that prioritises flexibility over protection.
Currently, the UK's major challenge lies in the increasing polarization of wealth resulting from technological change, which is fracturing previously stable interest coalitions.
Policymakers are torn between appeasing either socio-cultural professionals in an alliance with financial and technology industries, or helping low skilled workers vulnerable to automation and labour market competition from low-wage immigrants.
The structure of UK capitalism arguably makes it extremely difficult to accommodate both socio-economic groups as their electoral preferences on issues such as immigration and skills policies are drifting apart. The Thatcher and Major Conservative governments in the 1980s and '90s built a successful electoral coalition in a relatively low-immigration era by uniting business interests with low and medium-skilled workers. Blair's (initially very successful) strategy, by contrast, was to draw together business and socio-cultural professionals through open, pro-market policies while buying off the losers (Labour's traditional working class supporters) through tax credits for the low paid and substantial investment in public services. Austerity policies introduced to deal with the UK's large budget deficit in the wake of the financial crisis have rendered this strategy unworkable, however, and the Conservative governments from 2010 prioritised welfare retrenchment while forging ahead with New Labour's science and technology policies. This appears to have been built on a fragile political coalition which came apart over Brexit.
Top of the class? The UK, the 2020 agenda and labour mobility
Though the UK has been reluctant to participate in deepened European integration, it has been a more enthusiastic supporter of the EU's skills policies and growth strategies (particularly the 2020 agenda). Since the crisis, European governments and the EU have reached for technocratic solutions to the problems of low or unbalanced growth, set against a backdrop of difficult economic and fiscal restructuring. The Commission's Europe 2020 strategy, Although the UK has not reached the headline target on Europe 2020 of spending 3%
of GDP on R&D, this benchmark has been widely criticized as a crude measure of innovation capacity, as it is biased towards manufacturing activities and ignores intangible investment taking place in services industries in which the UK excels. When intangibles are included, the UK's performance rises to third place, behind Sweden and Belgium (Roth 2010 ).
The skills component of 2020 calls for a dual approach to furnish the hi-tech industries of the future with appropriately skilled staff while also not neglecting the skills needs at the lower end of the labour market (European Commission 2010b). Skills obviously form an There is considerable overlap between these objectives and core concerns of UK skills policies. The importance of preserving labour market 'flexibility' is continually emphasized and the strategy tends to define 'high-skills' in terms of possessing higher education rather than the German system of vocational education (Roth and Thum 2010) . The UK is one of the relatively small number of EU countries to already meet the 40% tertiary education target and UK skills policies also embody the 2020 assumption that increasing the supply of high-skills will encourage industry to upgrade. Indeed, one of the striking features of the EU's education and skills agenda is the preference for elite education, observed through such schemes as the The inability to foster a high, or even acceptable, level of skills provision across the board has been a long-standing failure of UK supply-side policies. Historically, the UK's education system has been geared towards production of general and high skills. In the proportion of university graduates it produces and provision of 'high skilled' workers, the UK does consistently well, ranking 11 th globally and expected to climb to 7 th by 2020 according to the UK government's skills agency (UKCES 2014). In low skills, however, the UK is ranked 20 th , and is projected to remain in this position by 2020 in spite of a reduction in the Plunkett and Pesoa 2013). Both high and low skilled jobs tend to be more resistant to being replaced by machines or computers than medium-skilled jobs as the functions involved are more variable (Goos and Manning 2003) . Taken together, the studies suggest that employment in high and low skills occupations has been rising at the expense of medium skill jobs. But if the UK training system is failing to keep pace with demand for low-skilled workers then how are firms in these segments meeting their recruitment needs?
The demand for low-wage immigration
One very obvious answer is immigration. The mismatch between the demand and supply of low-skill workers may help to explain UK employer's enthusiastic embrace of low-skilled immigrants, as well as successive UK governments' willingness to accommodate this. (2016) suggest that countries open to immigrants will encourage workers who complement their innovation and production system. LMEs like the UK will, accordingly, favour high as well as low-skilled migrants, whereas the FDI-led Irish economy has tended to focus on importing high skilled labour (Regan & Brazys this issue). Low levels of collective bargaining, inflexible housing markets that prioritise owner-occupation and thus limit labour mobility amongst the native population, and weakly regulated labour marketsall of these being characteristics of LMEs -also appear to encourage both kinds of immigration.
However, the effects of immigration on the labour market receiving them vary significantly by sector. As argued earlier, highly skilled immigrants at the top end of the labour market (Latvian computer programmers, French derivatives traders etc.) have tended to complement the domestic UK production regime, fueling growth in politically favoured high technology and financial sectors while drawing little in the way of political resistance. At the 
The UK and the political economy of skills policies
A number of analysts have suggested that a low-wage immigration policy appears to be not just a solution to firms' resistance to invest in training, but also a symptom, more generally, of a breakdown in the relationship between a country's production system and its education and Thus, policy failures on skills seem to be related to employers' inability to move up the value chain, rather than a product of partisan politics. The gestation of these policies has been long and they are remarkably unpartisan, having been enthusiastically undertaken by governments comprising all three main political parties and with the firm support of the main producer groups, including the Confederation of British Industry and Trades Union Congress.
There is ample evidence that policymakers were keenly aware of the links between having a large, low wage sector of the economy and social exclusion. For New Labour in The resilience of demand for low skill jobs concerns policymakers as it is strongly associated with higher incidences of poverty and inequality (Hanushek and Woessman 2008) .
Skill-systems in LMEs such as the UK are characterized by educational stratification, which reflects and reinforces economic inequality. Altering this, either by shifting towards a more egalitarian continental-type skills system or, at the very least, significantly enlarging the proportion of the labour force engaged in higher skilled activities, was therefore an enormously attractive political proposition for the centre-left/centre-right governments since the mid-1990s.
Moreover, economists regularly emphasise the link between skills and economic growth (Crafts and O'Mahony 2001; Crafts 2007). As products and processes become more complex, the demand for workers with higher skills increases, meaning that a shortage of these workers can undermine prosperity. Increasing attainment should also lead to higher wages if these workers find jobs appropriate to their skill level, boosting tax receipts and driving consumption. The EU's 2020 strategy, likewise, integrates skills policies into the broader competitiveness and knowledge economy agenda, and other EU countries also view skills and industrial policies as a package (see, for example, Germany's 'Hi-Tech Strategy' and France's 'National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and Employment'). On the other hand, and despite the rhetoric about 'upskilling' domestic workers, New
Labour also resolved to tackle skills shortages through immigration, rather than industrial and skills policies on their own. The decision to allow unlimited immigration from A8 countries was prompted by a 2001 report from the Home Office noting that immigration had previously been concentrated in economic sectors characterized by chronic skills shortages which it had helped to solve. These included high as well as low-skilled sectors, such as medicine, IT and catering, with the report noting that: 'In all three cases there is a net economic benefit to the In other words, while the thrust of industrial and skills policies during the 2000s was towards engineering a general upskilling of the UK's labour force, policymakers also appeared to have concluded that these would either be inadequate or would take too long to be effective.
UK from filling the gaps through migration. The result of migration is to reduce inflationary pressures and increase the efficiency of firms' (Glover
Immigration, especially of low-wage workers, was therefore the primary de facto policy for solving skills shortages and controlling inflation in the face of employers' reluctance to invest in training.
Accounting for the 'failure to train'
Rather than being a failure of policy design or lack of political will, the UK's longstanding 'failure to train' is rooted in the structure of its economy and has a number of causes. One, suggested by Finegold and Soskice (1988) , is that it is stuck in a 'low skills equilibrium'
where large parts of the economy have come to depend on cheap, low-skilled workersparticularly from 2004 accession countries -to produce low specification, less sophisticated good and services. This is suggestive of a problem of lack of demand for higher skills on the part of employers. This may be due to firms' uncertainty that there is a market for more sophisticated, higher priced goods to justify the accompanying increase in wages. In his analysis of high-skills ecosystems in California, Finegold (1999) has shown that high skills are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for upgrading an economy to higher valueadded production.
Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012) note that job training in the UK is provided through markets and in the general education system, with the State adopting a low-key role and the academic track prioritized over vocational routes into the workplace. Crouch et al (1999) have analysed the problem of low skills equilibria and suggest it highlights a central concern with skills policies in LMEs, in that public policy is geared towards the preferences of the individual firm which is not itself incentivized to push for or participate in skills strategies that will benefit the economy and society as a whole.
There is plenty of support for this analysis, although it is only part of the story.
Certainly, policy throughout much of the 2000s appeared to operate under the simplistic notion that the low skills equilibrium was a market failure that could be resolved simply by boosting the supply of publicly-funded skills. Skills were seen as a sufficient, rather than merely necessary, ingredient in industrial upgrading (Keep and Mayhew 2010) . Public policy was geared towards engendering a broad uplift in skill levels across the board and significantly greater resources were put towards education and training (see Fig.1 ). The New Labour government took the view that the number of low-skilled jobs was in decline and that it was the responsibility of the government and employers to invest to boost the numbers of higher skilled workers (Lloyd and Mayhew 2010) . On the other hand, the UK Commission on Employment and Skills, a government agency set up to coordinate skills policy, finds plenty of evidence of unmet appetite for training, with 4 in 10 firms wanting to undertake more training but facing barriers to doing so; consequently, only 58% of British firms are in a "skills equilibrium", either high or low (UKCES 2014: 31) . The number of UK firms providing training to workers (80%) in 2010 was well above the EU average of 66% and higher than Finland's 74%. Yet this measure takes no account of the quality of training, and is hard to square with a picture of UK firms being too timid to invest in training because of widespread fears of over-skilling. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 market failures rather than providing any incentives for employers to upgrade their skills needs. This was criticized by the OECD, which lambasted the UK's policymaking structure for being more complex and unstable than in most OECD countries, inhibiting employer engagement. The OECD noted that few countries have been able to achieve strong employer engagement without an equally strong apprenticeship system, something which was lacking at the time (OECD 2009: 18-19) . Labour succeeded in increasing the number of apprentice places, but failed to increase the number of firms employing apprentices, or significantly expanding the number of internationally-competitive Level 3 apprenticeships (Steedman 2013 -see Fig 2) .
Arguably, therefore, training policy over the last quarter century has tried to address both supply and demand factors. But it has been hamstrung by, among other things, overcentralisation and an inability to harness employers in a demand-led training system. The result leaves the UK with a skills system that is virtually unique in Europe. The government retains central control to set and micro-manage the curriculum and broad policy but, compared to most other countries, the central ministry has little direct responsibility for setting curricula, designing qualifications, allocating funds, or inspecting provision. This has led, ironically, to an overemphasis on written specification of training quality which is impossible to enforce centrally (Keep and Mayhew 2006) .
In summary then, enormous energy has been expended on devising strategies to resolve deficiencies in training at all levels, but these have not narrowed gaps in attainment between the UK and other countries in low and intermediate skills levels 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 However, an analysis of industrial strategy for the government carried out by a former industry minister warned that most of the impact on skills demand and employment growth arising from present policy will likely be concentrated at the top of the value chain in markets where the UK is already successful (Heseltine 2012: 125-6) . It is unclear how this will improve the performance of other sectors, particularly those connected with labour market segments reliant on workers with intermediate and lower skills, where a larger proportion of the British labor force is employed. Heseltine's analysis reinforced an earlier observation by Keep et al (2006) that UK policy has focused on attending to the science base and developing university-firm institutions for technology transfer while ignoring firm-level issues to do with workplace organization, job design and employment relations.
This stands in contrast to the successful innovation policies followed by Germany and the Nordic countries, which have been able to create broad-based innovation strategies founded upon collaborative workplace arrangements that encourage innovation within the firm (Ramstad 2009 ). In the UK, however, weak trade unions and a labour management innovation policy has therefore increasingly defaulted to the elite-focused, pure science model, which is further reinforced by the EU's 2020 strategy, and its FP7 research funding streams. On its own, this is not likely to generate a significant, economy-wide, boost to the demand for high skills and may in fact reinforce labour market dualization.
Conclusion
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